Prof. Dirk Kotzé
It is quite easy to see South Africa’s predicament in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after its serious military losses. Does it expose its international reputation and power as over-stated or misconceived? Is it a failure of its foreign policy and does it serve as an exposure of its real military power?
Numerous theories are in circulation about it, some conspiratorial in nature about South Africa’s interests in the region or the poor quality of military leadership. This happens on top of President Trump’s decision to terminate international support to many countries, including South Africa. In our case, the new expropriation legislation is presented as the villain. South Africa’s foreign relations are therefore under pressure.
But how much of South Africa’s diplomacy and international relations are affected by this? South Africa’s presence in Goma is in the first instance part of the peace efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) together with the UN’s peacekeeping force, MONUSCO. For more than 20 years South Africa has been directly involved in diplomatic and mediation roles in the DRC.
The Sun City peace agreement during the Mbeki era was part of South Africa’s policy of promoting peace-making on the continent. The eastern DRC remained the main outstanding matter and for that reason, the mandates of MONUSCO and the SADC mission were changed from peacekeeping to peacemaking and enforcement. This was not South Africa’s decision but it fully supported the change in approach.
Goma is about 3,800 km away from Pretoria. South Africa’s logistical lines are therefore very long even under the best conditions. Budget reductions over many years have made the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) increasingly vulnerable to any type of mission outside its borders. More recently, the SADC mission in northern Mozambique attested to it. While South Africa was part of MONUSCO it was less visible, but when the SANDF stands on its own, it is glaringly visible.
The playing field between the South African military forces and the M23 and Rwandan forces, fighting close to home, is very uneven. The risk taken by the South African government was that they became involved in a military contest while the real issue is a political one between the DRC and Rwanda. In the past, South Africa tried to take the lead in the political initiatives together with the UN and made progress with it.
Over time it developed into the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a ceasefire and political settlement. So far, these processes have also not resolved the conflict, because the latest developments have shown that President Kagame is not interested in a settlement but an outright victory. His ambition appears to be the regional hegemony.
South Africa’s foreign policies do not include a prominent military component. It promotes dialogue, mediation and peaceful transitions while Kagame relies primarily on military means. These incompatible international approaches reflect on South Africa as less muscular and powerful. The fact that the South African forces earlier withdrew from the SADC military mission in northern Mozambique should have served as an early warning to reconsider its military presence in the DRC. Ironically, the Mozambican SADC mission was replaced by about 4,000 Rwandese troops.
South Africa’s international reputation and power are located in its use of diplomacy. This is also the area in which President Ramaphosa is most successful. As chair of BRICS in 2023 and now as chair of the G20 group, his success relies on his negotiation experience and his instinctive application of consultative and consensus-building methods. For him to find common ground with Kagame in this respect, is very difficult.
The lesson of Goma for South Africa is in the first instance that the country is not in a position to present itself in terms of military strength under any circumstance. Therefore, military situations should be avoided for the foreseeable future. Military capacity is, unfortunately, unavoidable for any state who wants to be a prominent power.
The message for South Africa is therefore that it has to enter a long-term military capacity-building phase. It does not mean that it has to abandon its diplomacy and peace-building policy positions, but a stronger military capacity can also be used as “soft power”.
The modern military is not only used for offensive purposes but also to assist in humanitarian crises, to secure maritime safety for ships navigating the southern oceans or securing South Africa’s maritime resources (such as the islands and route to the Antarctic.
Goma does not signal the end of South Africa’s powerful position on the African continent. It has never been the main military power on the continent. It is however, a very serious wake-up call that its diplomatic, economic and scientific muscles are not enough to carry the weight of a big power in Africa.
Military innovation is often the laboratory for new applications in the civilian and business spheres. For the purpose of mediation and diplomacy, a strong military capacity is indispensable when “power mediation” is required in the case of incalcitrant participants. Goma followed a similar military failure in the Central African Republic.
Though the South African state is not under immediate threat of military risks, South Africa’s continental and international ambitions to be an influential global player will depend on a much stronger military presence. The negative message of Goma could therefore become a positive motivation for the future.
* Prof. Dirk Kotzé, Department of Political Sciences, Unisa
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.